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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellants' statement of the case, particularly
the summary of the pleadings, omits several matters
which should he briefly discussed before proceeding with
the argument. The complaint is said to be in the ''usual
form for an action to quiet title.'' Part of the prayer is
mentioned and nothing more is said about it. There are
several other allegations which should be noticed. It is
alleged that the defendants, and each of them, assert and
claim a right to use a portion of the plaintiff's land for
roadways and for the purpose of loading and unloading
merchandise from and upon railroad cars and trucks
and that during or about 1934, certain defendants, without the consent of the plaintiff, constructed a concrete
ramp upon the southwestern portion of the real estate
and that all of the defendants assert and claim the right
to drive trucks and other vehicles over it and are making
constant use of it wrongfully and in violation of the
rights of the plaintiff. It is also alleged that unless the
defendants are restrained by the court, and unless they
are required to remove the concrete ramp and loading
platform the trespas.ses will be frequent and repeated to
the irreparable injury of the plaintiff. (Abs. 1-4.)
The separate answers set up the ownership of land
adjacent to the plaintiff's land and assert ownership of
certain easements over and upon the plaintiff's land
consisting of right of ways, the spur track, loading platforms, wagon roads, team tracks, and other facilities by
virtue of grants and reservations in certain deeds dated
in 1923, and by implication. The defendants. specifically
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deny that they are trespassing upon or wrongfully using
the plaintiff's land and that they have the right to use
the loading platform, ramps and roadways. (Abs. 4-56.)
The replies to the separate answers admit the execution and delivery of the various deeds from the common
grantors and admit that when the said conveyances were
made in 1923, there was situated upon the south part of
plaintiff's property a spur track and a lumber platform
approximately 10 feet wide and 75 feet long which was
used for the purpose of loading and unloading merchandise upon railroad cars, and that it remained the
same until 1932 when certain of the defendants removed
it and substituted a concrete ramp covering a much
larger area. It is denied that the defendants have a
right to use any of plaintiff's premises except a lumber
platform 10 feet wide and 75 feet long attached to the
building located in the northwest corner of Lot 2 and the
railroad spur. (Abs. 56-75.)
For the convenience of the court a diagram of the
premises is attached to this brief. It is the same as
Exhibit A except that it shows the size and location of
the platform which the trial court found that the appealing defendants are entitled to maintain upon the plaintiff's land and also the location of the west door in the
rear of the Colorado Animal By-Products Company warehouse. This diagram shows the property ownership as
of the date suit was commenced, the railroad spur and the
concrete ramp.
The evidence discloses that on August 9, 1923, Seymour N. Bailey and his wife were owners of an undivided

B
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one-half interest in the premises now owned by plaintiff,
and Bert N. Bailey and wife were the owners of the other
one-half interest. Seymour N. Bailey and his wife conveyed their interest to Bert N. Bailey by a deed dated
August 9, 1923, and recorded on September 10, 1923, in
Book 11-Q of deeds, page 586. (Exhibit J, Entry 37.) The
original deed is not in evidence. The deed contains the
following reservations :
"Reserving, however, to the grantors the perpetual right to the maintenance and use of the platform now located on the Southern portion of said
premises about ten feet wide including the overlapping roof for said platform including also the
curve thereof along the railway spur as at present
constructed, with full right to repair, reconstruct or
rebuild the same within its pres.ent location.
Also reserving the perpetual right to the use of
the trackage over and along the South line of said
premises and to the team truck or auto drive along
the said track, all to be used in connection and for
the convenience of Lot 2 of said Block for the loading and unloading of merchandise.
It is also hereby agreed that without the consent
of Grantor, Seymour N. Bailey, or his assigns, that
no right shall be granted for the use of said railway
spur beyond the East end of said Lot 3. ''
It will be noted that the words ''and to the premises''
do not appear after the word ''premises'' in the second
paragraph, or anywhere in the deed. This is in1portant
because much of the appellants' brief is predicated upon
the meaning and significance of those words, and in
numerous places in the brief it is argued that the find-
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ings and decree are ''false to the record'' because the
words "and to the Premises" are omitted.
On August 9, 1923, a deed from Bert N. Bailey and
wife, and Seymour N. Bailey and wife conveyed to Bailey
& Sons Company, certain land as follows:
CONVEY AND \VARRANT:Commencing at a point 83¥2 feet West of the
Southeast corner of Lot 2, Block 43, Plat "A,'' Salt
Lake City Survey, thence North 10 rods; thence East
25%, feet; thence South 10 rods; thence West 25%
feet, to the place of beginning.
Together with trackage privilege now in use at
the North end of said property.
Subject to 1923 taxes which grantees assume and
agree to pay.
Also, commencing at the Southwest corner of
said Lot and Block, thence North 99¥2 feet; thence
East 58"%, feet; thence South 99¥2 feet; thence West
58"%, feet, to the place of beginning.
Also a perpetual right to the use of the railroad
spur together with the team, truck and auto drive
along the North line thereof and the platform for
loading and unloading from vehicles and cars,
through and over a part of the South 1/2 of Lot 3, of
said Block and Plat as at present constituted, with a
right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the same a.s
shall from time to time become necessary within its
present location.
Also a perpetual right of way for ingress, egress
and regress for all purposes over the following strip
of ground, to-wit:
Commencing 99 feet East of the Northwest corner of said Lot 2, and running thence South 76 feet;
thence West 40% feet; thence North 10¥2 feet;
5
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thence East 30% feet; thence North 65¥2 feet; thence
East 10 feet, to the place of beginning, to be kept
open for loading and unloading goods, merchandise
and other commodities from the platform along the
South line of Lot 3, Block and Plat aforesaid, above
referred to, together with the right of maintaining
a cover or roof over said Platform at the North end
of said right of way.
This deed is given subject to a mortgage of
$10,000.00 and interest from September 1, 1923.
Also subject to the taxes for the year 1923, all of
which grantees herein assume and agree to pay.
Signed: Bert N. Bailey
Leone Bailey
Seymour N. Bailey
Emma Z. Bailey
(Exhibit J, Entry 50.)
The foregoing is a full description of the land conveyed. The descriptions of the several parcels of land
are omitted in the appellants' statement of facts. (App.
Br. 5.) It will be noted that there is a separate reservation for each parcel conveyed. Thus, for the lot 23%,
feet wide, described in the diagram attached to this brief,
as Bailey & Sons property, a vacant lot, the only easement reserved is the trackage privilege as follows:
''Together with the trackage privilege now in
use at the North end of said property."
ll,or the lot described as the Summerhays property
the reservation is as follows:
''Also a perpetual right to the use of the railroad spur together with the team, truck and auto
drive along the North line thereof and the platform
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for loading and unloading from vehicles and cars,
through and over a part of the South lf~ of Lot 3, of
said Block and Plat as at present constituted, with
a right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the san1e as
shall from time to time become necessary within its
present location.
Also a perpetual right of way for ingress, egress
and regress for all purposes over the following strip
of ground, to-wit :
Commencing 99 feet East of the Northwest corner of said Lot 2, and running thence south 76 feet;
thence West 40 3;{&, feet; thence N~orth lOlf2 feet; thence
East 30%, feet; thence North 65lf2 feet; thence East
10 feet, to the place of beginning, to be kept open
for loading and unloading goods, merchandise and
other commodities from the platform along the
South line of Lot 3, Block and Plat aforesaid, above
referred to, together with the right of maintaining
a cover or roof over said platform at the North end
of said right of way." (Exhibit J, Entry 50.)
The latter part of the reservation refers to a tunnel
or passageway wholly on Lot 2.
At the time of the conveyances, Seymour and Bert
Bailey owned the property now occupied by the defendant, Colorado Animal By-Products Company; the property owned by J. J. and C. E. Summerhays and occupied
by J. W. Summerhays & Sons Company, the vacant lot
25%, feet wide, the property occupied by the Valvoline
Products Company, and the old Bailey building which is
located upon the West 57.75 feet of the Scowcroft property. The relative positions of these buildings may be
readily ascertained for the purpose of this argument by
an examination of the attached diagram, and the maps,
Exhibits A and R prepared by E. H. Merrill, a practicing
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engineer, showing the property in Lots 2 and 3 as of Jannary 15, 1939 and as of August 9, 1923.
The appellants, by their act in constructing, maintaining and using the concrete ramp described in the
pleadings, and as sketched in the attached diagram, have
sought to extend their perpetual right to the use of the
platform to such an extent that the concrete ramp which
has replaced the lumber platform is in its widest p1ace
approximately 56 feet and in its narrowest place is more
than three times the width of the platform described in
the deed. There is a retaining wall along the northern
edge of the ramp one foot in thickness and extending a
few inches above the concrete ramp itself. The evidence
in this ca.se shows an utter and wanton disregard for the
plaintiff's property rights. He was not even consulted
before the ramp was constructed.
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to the size
and location of the lumber platform referred to in the
deeds. The appellants contended that the old lumber
platform was 32 feet wide on its westerly edge and the
plaintiff's witnesses testified that the platform, as stated
in the deed, was 10 feet wide on its westerly edge and
that the 10 foot platform extended along the north edge
of the Colorado Animal By-Products Company Building
to the east side of the west door where it widened out
approximately to the spur track. The trial court believed
the respondent's witnesses, made findings of fact and
conclusions of law accordingly, and entered a decree
limiting the defendants' use of the plaintiff's property
for purposes of a platform to the area covered by the
original lumber structure. The trial court did not believe
that the reservations and grants in the deeds gave the
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appellants the right to use all of the plaintiff's property
as a right of way and linrited them to the use of the area
south of the spur track for roadway purposes. The
findings and decree as to these two points are assailed
by the appellants. There are no issues in the case as to
the right of the appellants to use the spur track nor the
right to maintain the roof over the platform.

ARGUMENT
':rhe points relied upon by the appellants will be discussed in order:

Point A.
It is contended that the court erred in denying the
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
appellants urge that the reply introduced a new and different cause of action; that the issues were framed by
the several answers and replies ; and that the complaint
went entirely out of the law suit. A few cases are cited
to sustain the proposition that the character of a law suit
may not be changed and a new cause of action introduced.
Neither the proposition urged or the cases cited are in
point. As observed in the statement of the case, the
complaint was not one merely to quiet title but included
a specific allegation that the defendants had wrongfully
constructed a concrete ramp upon the plain tiff's land
without his consent; they were asserting and claiming
the right to use it, and that unless required to remove
it the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury. The
prayer is for a decree quieting title as against the claims
asserted by the defendants, and for a decree requiring
removal of the concrete ?~amp and restrainin.q the de-

9
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fendants from using the plaintiff's property. (Abs. 2-4.)
When the defendants denied the allegations as to the
ownership of the plaintiff's property and the wrongfulness of the use and maintenance of the ramp, issues of
fact were framed. This will become apparent upon an
examination of the complaint, and the allegations contained in paragraphs numbers two, three, four, five
and six of the answer of Seymour N. Bailey and wife.
(Abs. 5-8.) Similar allegations appear in the answers
of the other appealing defendants. As a further defense
the defendants refer to the reservations in the two deeds
dated in 1923, and allege that the loading platforms and
roadways were open, visible and apparent when the property comprising lots 2 and 3 was divided. It is alleged in
paragraph eight of the Seymour Bailey answer (and similar allegations appear in all of the other answers) that
the plaintiff enlarged and extended a platform attached
to his warehouse which unlawfully interferes with the
defendants' free use of their easements. (Abs. 14-15.)
The prayer is that the defendants' title be quieted as to
their easements and right of ways and that. the plaintiff
be required to remove the pia tform so enlarged. This is
obviously a counterclaim, although not designated as such.
The replies to the several answers are substantially the
same. The affirmative allegations in the answers to the
effect that the defendants had the right to use the plaintiff's land for roadway purposes and to use the ramp as
at present constituted are denied. It is admitted that the
deeds containing the reservations were executed but all
of the allegations as to the meaning and construction of
the deeds are denied.
Apparently the defendants take the position that

10
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when the plaintiff admitted that in 1923 a lumber pJat.,.
form approximately 10 feet wide and 75 feet long stood
on his property and alleged that a concrete ramp covering
a much larger area was constructed in 1932, there was a
departure from the cause of action stated in the complaint. This contention is without merit for the reason
that the charge is made in the compJaint that the defendants wrongfully and without the consent of the plaintiff
constructed and are using the very colfiAcrete ramp, and
assert and claim the right to use it. Issues of fact are
also raised by the pleadings as to the right to use all of
the plaintiff's property as a right of way, and as to the
right of plaintiff to enlarge his own lumber loading platform.
It is elementary that if the pleadings present material issues of fact, the motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied.
49 C. J. 670, Sec. 948 ;
Miller v. White, 258 P. 565;
Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23;
Mapleton v. Kelley, 39 Utah 252, 117 P. 52.
If the motion is made by the defendants it may be
treated as a general demurrer and be governed by the
rules applicable thereto.
Coburn v. Bartholomew, 50 Utah 566, 167 P.
1156.
It is not even argued that the complaint does not state a
cause of action. The only argument is that the replies

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

state a new cause of action and as shown above this is
without merit.
Neve v. Allen, 55 Kan. 638, 41 P. 966.
Furthermore, if they did, this point could not be raised
by a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Mills v. Hart, 24 Colo. 505, 52 P. 680;
Wilson v. Jones, 67 Okla. 6, 168 P. 194.
The replies are not inconsistent with the complaint. The
complaint says that the defendants have without the consent of the plaintiff constructed and maintained upon his
property a large concrete ramp and the replies merely
deny affirmative allegations that the defendants have
certain easements over the plaintiff's property including
the right to maintain and use the ramp and narrow the
issues somewhat by admitting that the defendants have
the right to maintain a smaller lumber platform. There is
nothlng unusual about the pleadings. If counsel's position is sound the pleader in drafting his complaint would
have to anticipate just what easements or interests in the
property the defendant will claim and negative them in
the con1plaint. The trial court very properly denied the
motion.

Point B.
It is next contended that the trial court erred in making findings of fact which confine the defendants' easements to the use of the property south of the spur track
and to the use and maintenance of a platform covering
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the same area as it covered in 1923 at the time of the severance of Lots 2 and 3. At the outset, on page 24 of their
brief it should be noted that the appellants admit that
''their rights are determined by the deeds and the grants
or reservations therein contained and they can neither
detract from nor add to the rights therein granted and
reserved." It should also be noted that the appellants
do not refer to the specific property conveyed by the
deeds, but attempt to give the impression that all of the
property ever owned by Seymour or Bert Bailey or by
Bailey & Sons is benefited by every grant or reservation.
Let us analyze the deeds :
The deed from Seymour to Bert Bailey dated August
9, 1923, described only the property now owned by the
plaintiff. It will be noted that it expressly states that the
reservations of the right to the use of the trackage and
to the team truck ·or auto drive along the track are for the
benefit of Lot 2 for the loading and unloading of merchandise. There is nothing said about which side of the
track the team truck or auto drive was on. The evidence
indicates that at one time a team, truck and auto drive
along the north side of the track was used for the benefit, not of Lot 2, but Lot 3, as a means of ingress and
egress to and from the warehouse now owned by the
plaintiff and, an old hay barn. The hay barn burned
down in 1918 and the road fell into disuse. As observed
by appellants, the old concrete road is now covered with
gravel. The roadway along the track used for loading and
unloading in 1923 was the one along the south .side of the
tracks by means of which trucks and wagons loaded and

13
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unloaded merchandise upon and from the lumber loading
platform .. As shown by the attached diagram, the loading platform in the rear of the properties involved in this
appeal, which the court found was only 10 feet wide and
was quite a distance from the old roadway north of the
tracks which led at one time to the hay barn and to the
warehouse, but the roadway to the south of the tracks
was located adjacent to the lumber platform and was
used for loading and unloading merchandise. The deed
refers to only one roadway and the parties obviously had
reference to the road south of the tracks. The deeds themselves, and the evidence as to the relative location of the
platform and the spur track are sufficient to support the
findings of the trial court.
The reference to the "north line thereof" found in
the deed to Bailey & Sons Company is relied upon to indicate that the team, truck and auto drive was on the
north side of the track. Counsel does not point out that
this g'rant of a right of way is for the benefit only of the
lot in the Southwest corner of Lot 2 now owned by Summerhays. The argument is deceptive in that it attempts
to impress the reader that the deed to Bailey & Sons
Company described, in connection with this grant, all of
the property in Lot 2. It is significant that the property
to be benefited is in the southwest corner of Lot 2. The
old road to the hay barn and the warehouse would be of
no benefit to the lot so situated, but the roadway south of
the track between the track and the old lumber platform
would be the one vital to the needs of the occupant of the
Summerhays property and the only one used. Further-
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more a reading of the entire deed from the abstract, Exhibit J. Entry 50, (not from the excerpts quoted by appellant) will indicate clearly that the reference to the
''north line thereof'' means the north line of ''said Lot''
meaning Lot ~. It described the railroad spur and auto
drive as both being along the north line of the lot through
and over a part of the south lj2 of Lot 3. If the deed had
conveyed, the Scowcroft property located some distance
east, there may have been some merit to counsels' contention, but there is none, with reference to the Summerhays property or any other property. Again we reiterate
that the grant in the Bailey & 8 ons Company deed is the
only one that mentions (JIYty north line, and it specifically
described the Summerhays prope'rty and that only as the
dominant estate.
The grant is not as counsel contends for the benefit of
all of Lot 2.
Under Point B counsel repeatedly refers to the words
"and to the premises" which it is claimed should be included in the description of the easements reserved in
the Seymour Bailey-Bert Bailey deed. It is claimed that
those words intended to reserve a right of way over all of
plaintiff's property. As pointed out the words do not appear in the abstract of the deed, Entry 37, Exhibit J.
The trial court has as much right to base its finding
upon the description in Exhibit J as it would have had to
base it upon the abstract, Exhibit X, or upon any other
abstract. Under the circumstances the finding of the
trial court should not be disturbed.
Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 208 P. 526;
James v. Jensen, 50 Utah 485, ~67 P. 827.
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Point C.
The appellants contend that the findirugs of fact, conclusions of law and decree as to the location and dimensions of the loading platfonn described in the deeds are
not supported by the evidence. Before discussing the testimony of the various witnesses, let us reexamine the
reservation in the deeds with respect to the loading platform. In the deed from Seymour to Bert Bailey (Exhibit
J, Entry 37) it will be noted that the platform is described as follows:
"About 10 feet wide including the overlapping
roof for said platform including also the curve thereof along the railway spur as at present constntcted
with full right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the
same within its- present location." (Italics ours.)
It is admitted by appellants as observed above that:
"The parties are bound and their rights are determined by the deeds and grants and the reservations therein contained and they can neither detract
from nor add to the rights therein contained."
(App. Br. 24.)
Yet they immediately forsake this proposition and
contend that the trial court erred in finding and decreeing
that the rights of appellants were determined by the
deeds. They would have this court believe that the express
limitations to the effect that a platform "about 10 feet
wide'' could be maintained and used "as at present constructed" and could be rebuilt "within its present location," are meaningless and that the defendants could
properly construct a concrete ramp upon the plaintiff's
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property which is, in its widest place, more than five
times the width of the orig·inal lun1ber platform. It is
claimed that since the appellants had a right of way over
the area south of the tracks to drive to and from the
loading platform, they had a right to grade it and surface
it and that was all they were doing when they constructed
the ramp over the entire southwest corner of the plaintiff's property covering fifty-six feet of his frontage,
without his knowledge and consent. Such an argument
clearly does violence to the express limitations in the
deeds of the right to maintain the platform ''as at present constructed" and in "its ,present location."
Testimony was offered by both plaintiff and defendant as to the size and location of the platform. The defendants' witnesses testified that the west edge of the
platform was 32 feet wide and that it covered nearly the
same area as is covered by the concrete ramp. A sharp
conflict arose as to whether the west edge of the lumber
platform was 32 feet wide or 10 feet wide. The court
found that at the time of the severance of the property
now owned by the plaintiff, from the appellants' property, the lumber loading platform covered the following
described land :
"Beginning at a point 7.3 feet East of the Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block 43, Plat 'A,' Salt Lake
City Survey; thence North 10.7 feet; thence East 34
Feet; thence North 14.6 feet; thence South approximately 70 degrees East 61.2 feet following the curve
of the Oregon Short Line Tracks and on the South
side thereof; thence South 5.0 feet to the south side
of said Lot 3; thence West 91.7 feet to point of be-
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ginning. Also steps to said platform extending 7
feet west and 5 feet North from the Southwest corner of .said platform.'' (Finding of Fact No. 13,
Abs. 149.)
This finding is assailed as unsupported by the evidence
and it is even contended that the description was supplied
de hors the record by someone after the case was tried
and submitted. This contention is entirely groundless.
The following evidence supports the finding as to the size
and location of the lumber platform as it existed August
9, 1923.
Testimony of Joseph F. Merrill is that the location
and size of the platform was, as .shown by the map, Exhibit L, and by the insurance company maps, Exhibits M
and N. It will be noted that the very dimensions specified in finding No. 13 appear on the map, Exhibit L.
(Abs. 84, 85-Tr. 166, 167.)
Testimony of Arnold Evans that in 1926 he was employed at the warehouse now occupied by the Colorado
Animal By-Products Company, but then occupied by
the Kelly-Springfield Tire Company. He describes the
platform as follows :
'' Q. Will you describe the platform at the rear
of the building when you went there~
A·. Well, there was a platform extending out
from the building, I would say about 10 feet with
steps leading from the third west side up to the platform to the first door, if I remember correctly.
After that it extended out almost to the spur track.
Q. On which side of the first door was the extension'
A. I think on the east side.'' ( Tr. 328.)
18
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:Mr. Evans indicated the locations of the two doors in the
north of the warehouse with a red pencil. (See Exhibit
R.)

Eugene H. Merrill measured the distance from the
west side of the west door which is the first do-or referred
to by Mr. E:vans and found it to be 36 feet. (Abs. 135, 136,
Tr. 233.) He found the width of the west door to be 6
feet and the distance fron1 the north side of the building
to the widest point of the wooden platform which is located on the property at present and whicli the testimony
shows was not changed when the concrete ramp was constructed to be 23 feet. The distance from the west side of
the building to the sidewalk at the northwest corner was
found to be 6.7 feet. There is no contention made by appellants that the location of the building now occupied by
Colorado Animal By-Products Company or the location
of the west door has been changed during the last 20
years.
Mr. Evans testified also that Exhibits P, Q and R, the
first two being railroad rna ps of the Oregon Short Line
and the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroads and the
latter being a drawing made by E. H. :Merrill from other
maps fairly represent the platform as it was in 1926.
(Abs. 123-128.) The Oregon: Short Line map shows the
dimensions of the platfonn to be the same as described
in the findings and decree. The witness also testified that
the area indicated in red pencil innnediately north of the
Colorado Animal By-Products Company warehouse shows
the additions made by the Kelly-Springfield Tire Company in 1926. ( Abs. 125.)
19
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Willard Snow who also worked at the Kelly-Springfield warehouse in 1926 described the platform as follows:

"Q. Will you describe the platform as it was
when you went there~
A. You mean the one just directly north of the
building. That was about-there was some steps
leading up to this platform, almost at the corner of
the building, up to this platform. This platform was
about, I imagine around ten, maybe eleven feet wide,
and then from this main platform there was another
little ramp, probably oh, maybe, five feet, maybe,
leading up to the west door.
Q. And on the east what was the platform~
A. The east?
Q. Yes.
A. There was a ramp directly from the west
door at right angles right out to the tracks that had
just been built by the company when I entered their
employ. It was new construction.
Q. That is, by the Kelly-Springfield Tire Company~

A.
pany.

Yes, by the Kel1y-Springfield Tire Com-

Q. Now, describe that platform or ramp~
A. The platform ran at right angles from the
west door directly out to the spur track, and it was
probably, maybe six feet wide.
Q~ And about how long~
A. You mean from the building Y
Q. F:rom the building out to the track Y
A. About twenty-five or thirty feet.
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Q. Then what was immediately east of the new
rampf
A. Well, the old ramp that connected with this
ramp that the Kelly-Springfield Tire Company built,
it went off east and followed the spur track around
over to the end of Bailey's building.
Q. It followed the curve of the track 1
A. It followed the curve of the track, yes.
Q. About how far did that extend north from
the building at the widest point¥
A. vVell, about the same as that Kelly-Springfield platform. That hit pretty close to the center, I
believe, or right at the east edge of the Kelly-Springfield ramp that went out, which was about twentyfive or thirty feet." {Tr. 355, 356-Abs. 131.)
When Mr. Snow was shown the map, Exhibit P, which
shows the same dimensions of the platform as appear in
the findings and decree and he was asked whether it was
a fair representation of the platform in 1926, he said,
"that looks just like it to me." (Tr. 359, Abs. 132.)
The testimony of the two disintersted witnesses, Evans
and Snow, as to the size and location of the platform was
definite and clear, and it is submitted that this testimony
together with the actual measurements made by E. H.
Merrill amply support the findings as to the size and location of the old platform. The right of the appellants to
maintain and use a platform on the plaintiff's property is
limited by the deed to the location of the old platform and
the finding as to the location of the old lumber platform
is supported by substantial and conclusive evidence. The
testimony of Evans and Snow is not adequately ab-
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stracted. It may be found in the transcript, pages 327 to
376.
The map attached to Exhibit 0, a public document of
the Public Service Commission of Utah, show.s the platform as described by plaintiff's witnesses.
The evidence supports the specific findings as to the
dimensions of the original lumber platform without reference to any of the maps introduced for illustrative purposes. It may be briefly summarized:
"7.3 feet East of the Southwest corner of Lot 3
Block 43, Plat' A,' Salt Lake City Survey."

William I. Richards, a witness called by the defendants
testified that the distance was 7 feet 8 inches. (Abs. 106.)
The discrepancy between this testimony and the starting
point in the decree is four inches and it is in favor of the
defendants so they cannot complain. \Vitnesses Ryser
and Richards, both called by the defendants, testified
that the marks on the building shown on the photographs,
Exhibits 1, 3, and 6, particularly Exhibit 6 show where
the western edge of the old lumber platform was located
and also show where the steps were. The building is on
the property line and it will be noticed that by 0ounting
the bricks between the corner of the building marked
Colorado Animal By-Products Company, to the mark
which the defendants' witnesses testified was even with
the western edge of the pia tform that there are 10lj2
bricks. Each brick, as is commonly known, is 8 inches
long and the combined width of the mortar would be appr-oximately 4 inches or a little less than lf2 inch between
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two bricks. The total distance then from the corner of
the building to the edge of the platform would be 88 inches
or 7-1/3 feet.
Thence North 10.7 Feet
The width of the original lumber platform at its western most edge "Tas said to be between 10 and 11 feet by
the following witnesses :
Joseph F. Merrill. (Abs. 84.)
Taylor Merrill. (Abs. 87.)
Arnold Evans. ( Abs. 124.)
Willard Snow. (Abs. 131, 132.)
Any discrepancy amounts only to a fraction of a foot and
the finding should not be disturbed. These are the witnesses the trial court chose to believe.
Thence East 34 Feet.
Eugene H. Merrill made measurements of the distance
between the Northwest corner of the Colorado Animal
By-Products Building and the west side of the West door
and found the distance to be 36 feet and the width of the
door to be six feet. (Abs. 135, 136.) Both Arnold Evans
and Willard Snow testified that the 10 foot lumber platform extended east along the building to the east side of
the west door and that it then jogged to the north extending out to within 18 or 20 inches of the railroad track.
(Abs. 124-131, 132-135.) The platform .starts 7.3 feet east
of the northwest corner of the building. By mathematical
computation, it will be found that the platfonn extended
east 34.7 feet before it jogged to the north. The discrepancy of .7 of a foot is also in favor of appellants and they
cannot complain.
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Thence North 14.6 Feet.
The evidence shows that the location of the spur track
has not been changed since 1923 and that the Colorado
Animal By-Products Company warehouse is in the same
location as it was before 1923. (Abs. 89, 90.) The map,
Exhibit A, prepared by E'. H. Merrill, an engineer and
duly authenticated accurately .shows the location of the
spur track and the building to which the lumber platform was attached. (Abs. 78-80.) By the use of a measure, it will be found that the distance from the building
at a point 42 feet east of the Northwest corner of the
building to a point 20 inches south of the railroad track is
25.3 feet. The platform was 10 feet 7 inches wide so the
distance of the jog to the north would be 14.6 feet. Furthermore, Willard Snow testified that it was about 25 or
30 feet from the west door of the warehouse to the track.
(Abs. 132, 135.) Arnold Evans testified to the same effect.
Thence South Approximately 70 Degrees Eas~t 61.2 Following the Curve of the Oregon Short Lin1e Tracks and
on the South Side Thereof.
The testimony of the defendants' witnesses, Ryser
and Richards, is to the effect that the rear part of the
platform follows the curve of the track as it did before
the concrete was installed. (Abs. 93, 94, 106, 108, 109, 111,
Exhibits 4, 5.) The tracks have not been moved so therefore the angles, directions and distances could be and
were taken from the map prepared by E. H. Merrill, Exhibit A. The angle and distance south and east following
the curve of the Oregon Short Line Track ·was con1put.ed
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from Exhibit A which shows the easterly part of the platform as it was in 1923 and as it is at present. (Exhibit 5,
Abs. 93.) "'\Vitnesses called by the defendants, William I.
Richards and M. A. Jensen testified that except for enlarging the clearance between the platform where it
curves along the track and the spur track, the outside
boundaries of the platform were never changed between
1910 and 1933. ( Abs. 113, 123.)
Thence South 5 feet to the 8outh Side of Lot 3.
This dimension is the same now as it was in 1923 and
the measurement is taken from the map, Exhibit A. (Exhibit 5, Abs. 93.)
Thence West 91.7 Feet More or Less to Point of Beginning.
This, is the closing line of the description and is taken
from the map, Exhibit A, which shows the building and
the eastern end of the platform as it is now and as it has
been since 1923 and before.
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the foregoing counsel's argument on page 42 of appellants' brief
that:
''The court may search the record from end to
end and it will not find any testimony of any such
dimensions, or that the platform was of the size so
described in the Findings, Conclusions and Decree,''
is clearly without merit. It is also charged that these
courses and distances could only be taken from the various maps which were introduced for illustrative purposes.
It is highly significant that whether the maps have any
value, in connection with the oral testimony, as substan-
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tive evidence or not, they are obtained from many separate sources; they show the platform as described in the
findings, as it was before the concrete structure was put
in and they are all the .same. Not one shows the western
extremity of the platform to be 32 feet wide. It is also
significant that the appellants have been unable to produce a single map or photograph which sustains their
position.
It is argued in the appellants' brief over several pages
that the reference in the deed to a platform 10 feet wide
described the easterly end of the platform with a curve
to the north along the spur track. This argument is absurd for the reason that if the platform was ever 10 feet
wide at the easterly end, it would have extended well
past the middle of the railroad tracks. See Exhibit A.
No one contends that the railroad tracks have ever been
moved.
This court has declared many times that although in
equity cases it may review conflicting evidence to determine whether findings of the trial court are supported it
has repeatedly held that the findings will not be disturbed
unless they are clearly against the weight of the evidence.
This rule is well stated in the recent case of Stanley vs.
Stanley, 94 P. (2d) 465, as follows:
"The scope of review on appeal in equity cases
is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. 'This court is
authorized by the state constitution to review the
findings of the trial courts in equity cases but the
findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence
will not be .set aside unless it manifestly appears that
26
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the court has misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence.
Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313, 315. ''
See also:
Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712;
Singleton v. Kelley, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63;
Holmanv. Christens'On, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457;
Zuniga v. Eivans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. (2d) 513;
Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P. (2d) 1;
Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Company, 94 Utah
134, 76 P. (2d) 234.
It is also settled that it is the exclusive province of
the trial judge to pass on the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence. The rule is stated as follows
in the case of Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 208 P.
526:
''Nor can the assignment he sustained that the
court's findings are contrary to or not supported by
the evidence. On some of the material facts the
statements of plaintiff and his witnesses are in direct
conflict with the statements of the defendant and his
witnesses. It was the exclusive province of the trial
court to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given to their statements. There
is some substantial evidence in support of every essential finding made by the court, and in view of
that we cannot interfere with the court's findings."
See also James v. Jensen, 50 Utah 485, 167 P. 827.
The law as to the right of the owner of the dominant
estate to materially change or enlarge the servitude upon
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the servient estate is well stated in the case of Stephens
Ranch Company v. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528 at page
535, 161 P. 459, thus:
''The law is further well settled that when one
acquires lands which are burdened with such an easement or prescriptive right he takes them subject to
such right, but he is not also bound to submit to a
material change or enlargement of the right by the
dominant owner if thereby the servient estate is injured to a larger extent than it was under the right as
it existed when the servient estate was acquired. It
is not necessary to cite or review a large number of
cases upon this point. See Creeley Irr. Co. v. Van
Trotha, 48 Colo. 12, 108 P. 985; Manier v. Myers
and Johns, 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 514; S. C. 45 Ky.
(6 B. Mon.) 132; Schumacher v. Brand, 72 Wash.
"
543, 130 P. 1145;
See also:
17 Am. Jur. 98, and cases there cited.
The structures or roadways on the servient estate
which are used in the enjoyment of the easement cannot
be materially altered without the consent of the owner
of the servient property. The following is a g·ood statement of the rule :
''As a general rule when the character of an
easement is once fixed, no material alterations can
be made in physical conditions which are essential to
the proper enjoyment of the easement except by
agreement. This applies to both the owner of the
easement and the owner of the fee. The test is to
determine the right to make a particular alteration
is whether the alteration is .so substantial as to re28
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suit in the creation and substitution of a different
servitude from that which previously existed. It is
no defense in an action involving such an alteration
that the mode and n1anner of using the easement will
be less burdensome to the servient estate, and n1ore
convenient to the owner of the dominant lands.'' 17
An1. Jr. 1006.
The extent to which a court of equity will go to confine the servitude to that part of the .servient estate
which is reserved for a right of way by deed, is well illustrated in the leading California case, Winslow v. Vallejo, 148 Cal. 723, 84 P. 191, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 851. In
that case the deed did not definitely describe the area subject to a right of way for the laying of water pipes. In
granting an injunction against the city and restraining it
from enlarging the servitude, the court said:
"In Jennison v. "\Valker, 11 Gray, 423, the court
said: 'Where an easement in land is granted in general terms, without giving definite location and description to it, so that the part of the land over
which the right is to be exercised, cannot be definitely ascertained, the grantee does not thereby acquire
a right to use the servient estate without limitation
as to the place or mode in which the easement is to
be enjoyed. When the right granted has been once
exercised in a fixed and defined course, with the full
acquiescence and consent of both parties, it cannot be
changed at the pleasure of the grantee.'
This case involved the location and course of an
aqueduct. The same principle has been applied to the
construction of a dam (Evangelical Lutheran Orphan
Home v. Buffalo Hydraulic Asso.) (64 N. Y.) 561;
and to the location of a right of way. \Vynkoop v.
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Burger, 12 Johns 222; Bannon v. Angier, 2 .Allen
128 · 0 'Brien v. Goodrich, 177 Mass. 32, 58 N. E. 151;
'
.
Garraty
v. Duffy, 7 R. I. 476. We think,
therefore,
that the construction given to the conveyance by the
lower court was correct, and that the laying of the
10-inch pipe, with the acquiescence of both parties,
measured and limited the location and the extent of
the easement. 'It is elementary that the location of
an easement of this character cannot be changed by
either party without the other's consent after it has
once been finally established, whether by the express terms of a grant, or by acts of the parties
tantamount in their effect.' Vestal v. Young, 147
Cal. 715,82 P. 381; Allen v. San Jose Land & Water
Co., 92 Cal. 138, 15 L. R. A. 93, 28 P. 215. If the defendant had no right to lay the new pipe, injunction
was the proper remedy. 'It is the settled law of this
state that, irrespective of other damage, an injunction will be granted to prohibit the continuance of action that obstructs one in the free use and enjoyment
of his land, where such action, if continued, will ripen
into an easement.' Vestal v. Young, supra, and cases
cited."
There can be no doubt but that the effect of constructing the concrete ramp across the front of plaintiff's property not only violated the terms of the deed but very substantially and materially enlarged the servitude. Upon
an examination of the photographs, Exhibits 1-6 and
B-H inclusive, and of the map, Exhibit A, it will be
apparent that the concrete ramp covers more than twothirds of plaintiff's frontage. It is bound on the north by
a concrete retaining wall one foot thick and it is so constructed as to make the ramp and the entire area covered
usable only by the occupants of the appellants' premises.
30
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The deed does not give the beneficiaries the exclusive
right to use the roadway to and from the loading platform and when the loading platform was only about 10
feet wide to a distance of 42 feet from the west property
line, the area now covered by the concrete ramp could be
readily used by both the owner of the dominant and servient estates. Furthermore, prospective purchasers of
plaintiff's property, as it is encumbered by the great
concrete ramp readily observe that they can buy no frontage whatever. If the plaintiff had permitted the ramp to
remain as it is without objection for the prescriptive
period his property would have become burdened with an
easement to maintain a concrete ramp for the exclJwsive
benefit of the dominant estate, covering nearly all the
frontage, which very .substantially decreases its value. It
is idle to argue that such wrongful appropriation of the
plaintiff's property did not inerease the burden and did
not materially change the nature of the servitude. To sustain this unlawful aet of the appellants would destroy in
a measure the sacred right of a pro,perty owner to .determine just how and by whom his land may be used. It
is submitted that the findings of the trial court as to the
location of the original lumber platform and as to the concrete ramp and parts of the decree requiring the removal
of that portion of the ra1np which extends beyond the
area occupied by the original platform are all amply sustained by the evidence and by the law.

Point D.
Counsel admits that there is no statutory support for
the argument that the trial court erred in failing to give
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the defendants any ·opportunity to be heard upon objections and proposed amendments, and in not ruling upon
the objections. The rule quoted by the appellants as one
promulgated by the Third District Court provides that
the judge may designate the time for argument and settle the same, etc. It will be noted that this is discretionary
with the judge. The objections were submitted as suggestions to aid the court in making its finding and decree.
The trial judge is not required to let counsel orally argue
them, and when he .signed the findings and decree he, of
course, ruled adversely to the appellants' contentions.
The cases cited by appellants to support their contention
in this regard are not in point. They relate to situations
where the court failed to make findings on material issues and failed to rule upon plaintiff's motion to strike
parts of the pleadings. It is .submitted that this contention is wholly without merit.

Point E.
In view of the full disclosure in the preceding pages
of the source of the evidence which support the findings
of fact and decree with reference to the dimensions of the
platform as it was in 1923, the argument under Point E
is entirely beside the point. As noted above the findings
do not rest upon courses and distances in maps introduced only for illustrative purposes, but rest upon the
testimony of witnesses and upon the map, Exhibit A prepared by a practicing engineer which shows the location
of structures ·on the ground which have not been altered
since prior to 1923. The appellants had full opportun-
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ity to cross-examine E. H. Merrill, who prepared the map,
Exhibit A, and as far as the record discloses no inaccuracies as to the location of the concrete ramp, the spur
track, the building now occupied by the Colorado Animal
By-Products Company, or the other buildings and property lines have been found . .A:s pointed out above the findings are sustained in part by the testimony of the appellants' own witnesses, Ryser, Richards and Jensen.
The reference in the appellants' brief to the questions
asked of one of the attorneys for the respondent at the
time the motion for a new trial was presented (Abs. 179182) is not accurate. Upon a reading of all of the questions and answers, it will be noted that Mr. E. J. Skeen
said:
"Well, I think E.ugene Merrill took a tape measure and went down ~nd rechecked the measurements
that he had made on his original map am.d which is
in evidence, and which also appears in the railroad
maps and the insurance maps in evidence." (Abs.
179.)
The question as to whether Eugene Merrill did or did not,
in an abundance of precaution recheck courses and distances (no one know.s what courses and what distances)
has nothing whatever to do with this case. The question
is whether the description of the old platform contained
in the deed and decree is supported by the evidence, and
as we have painstakingly pointed out every course and
every distance is amply supported by evidence, properly
authenticated and received, much of it offered by the
appellants themselves. The various railroad and insnr-
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ance maps were properly received in connection with te• •.;
timony that they show the platform as it was before the
concrete was installed.
All of the assignments of error relied upon by the
appellants are without merit, and the decree of the district court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

J. D. SKE·EN and
E. J. SKEEN,
.Attorneys for Respondent.
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